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An inventory search of a legally impounded vehicle can be
a reasonable invasion of privacy under both the Louisiana and
United States Constitution. However, the Louisiana Supreme
Court has required much more proof of this reasonableness
than the United States Supreme Court. Seemingly, the Louis-
iana court believes that the need to search may exist under
some circumstances, while the United States Supreme Court
feels that there is always such a need. At any rate, both views
of reasonableness might well be improved by letting a magis-
trate, rather than the police, decide what is a "true inventory
search."
Richard W. Beard
THE MEDIA, THE PUBLIC AND GOVERNMENT-Is THERE A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ACCESS?
Petitioner, sheriff of Alameda County, refused respondent
broadcasting company permission to inspect and photograph
areas of a county jail in which a prisoner's suicide had allegedly
occurred. Petitioner's policy was to exclude access to both the
press and the public. Respondent brought an action alleging
that exclusion was a deprivation of its first and fourteenth
amendment rights. The district court preliminarily enjoined
petitioner from preventing respondents reasonable access to
the jail. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding
that "[tihere is no discernable basis for a constitutional duty
[on government] to disclose, or for standards governing disclo-
should be required to authorize searching an impounded vehicle for evidence. In State
v. Lain, 347 So. 2d 167, 171 n.1 (La. 1977), Justice Dixon wrote: "The author is of the
personal view that exigent circumstances do not exist when the automobile is lawfully
(R.S. 40:989) in custody of police at the station. If there is an opportunity to obtain a
search warrant, the circumstances are not exigent, and we should require that a war-
rant be obtained. Nevertheless, that is not the state of the law." Also, in State v.
Williams, 347 So. 2d 231, 235 n.2 (La. 1977), Justice Calogero remarked: "Although
this author personally believes, along with two of the other Justices of this Court, that
when an automobile has been taken into police custody at a stationhouse that a
search should never be authorized without a warrant even though 'exigent circum-
stances' had existed earlier at the scene, the state of the law is otherwise."
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sure of or access to information."' Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438
U.S. 1 (1978).
Throughout American history, the press has scrutinized
government in order for the populace to govern itself in an
informed manner. In return, the American colonists insulated
the media from governmental abridgment, by vesting the press
with constitutional safeguards.' Some scholars maintain that
the "press has a preferred position in our constitutional scheme
. . .to bring fulfillment to the public's right to know." 3 Under
this theory, the media can claim special constitutional privi-
leges, not for itself but for the benefit of the public, the true
recipient; the media, acting as the public's surrogate, gathers
and disseminates information vital to the preservation of de-
mocracy.'
1. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978). Whether the quoted passage
is the holding is not free from difficulty. See text at notes 41-46, infra.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
Although the first amendment purports to address only the United States Con-
gress, the various provisions of the first amendment have been held applicable to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (freedom of the press); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380
(1927) (freedom of speech).
3. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 721 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See,
e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64,
77 (1964); Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst, 494 F.2d 994, 998 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd sub
nom., Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); PRIVACY AND PUBLIC DISCLO-
SURES UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 104, 107 (D. Anderson & B. Janes eds.
1976) [hereinafter cited as PRIVACY AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURES]; Nimmer, Is Freedom of
the Press a Redundancy: What Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HAST. L.J. 639
(1975).
4. See Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HAST. L.J. 631 (1975) (address at the Yale
Law School Sesquicentennial Convocation, November 2, 1974), where it is stated:
It is also a mistake to suppose that the only purpose of the constitutional guar-
antee of a free press is to insure that a newspaper will serve as a neutral forum
for debate, a "market place for ideas," a kind of Hyde Park corner for the
community. A related theory sees the press as a neutral conduit of information
between the people and their elected leaders. These theories, in my view, again
give insufficient weight to the institutional autonomy of the press that it was
the purpose of the Constitution to guarantee.
Id. at 634.
For a discussion of the importance of a free press in maintaining democracy, see,
e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 839-40 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); New York
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The perimeters of the constitutional protection extended
to the media in disseminating information to the public have
been largely defined by the United States Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court has enunciated guidelines which tend to ensure
the viability of the press, primarily in the areas of defamation,l
prior restraints on publication,6 and sanctions imposed subse-
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring); Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965); R.
LISTON, THE RIGHT TO KNOW: CENSORSHIP IN AMERICA 108 (1973); Catledge, Historic
Confrontation between Government and Press: Alive and Well, Thanks to Watergate,
20 Loy. L. REV. 1 (1974).
5. For years, the Supreme Court's attitude toward defamation was that it did
not deserve constitutional protection. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250
(1952); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
The seminal case extending constitutional protection for defamatory statements
was New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), wherein the Court held that
a plaintiff in a defamation suit who is a public official may not recover absent a
showing that the alleged defamatory statement was made with knowledge of its falsity
or in reckless disregard of whether or not it was false, which the Court has called
"actual malice." See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (actual malice
not required in order for plaintiff to recover if plaintiff is neither public official nor
public figure); Old Dominion Branch 496, National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin,
418 U.S. 264 (1974) (defamatory statement distinguished from mere opinion); Curtis
Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (actual malice required where plaintiff, although
not a public official, is a public figure); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966) (public
official status more clearly defined); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968)
(actual malice more clearly defined); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (actual
malice standard extended to criminal context where aggrieved victim is a public offi-
cial).
6. Of all governmental abridgments of freedom of the press, prior restraints most
closely resemble the type of governmental activity that the first amendment was
designed to prevent-censorship. For this reason, the Supreme.Court has developed a
very firm doctrine against prior restraints, expressing that "[any system of prior
restraints . . . comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitu-
tional validity." Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
While the origins of the doctrine inhere in the rationale behind the free press
guarantee, the Supreme Court first invoked the presumption against prior restraints
in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), wherein the Court struck down as violative
of the first amendment a state's procedure for abating scandalous newspapers as public
nuisances. Later cases have adhered to the Court's reasoning in Near. See Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (mere possibility of prejudice to defendant's
right to fair trial does not justify prior restraint); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U.S. 233 (1936) (special tax on newspapers invalidated as unconstitutional attempt to
silence the governor's critics).
The most graphic example of the heavy burden on the government to overcome
the presumption against constitutionality when a prior restraint is imposed is New
York Times Co. v. United States (the Pentagon Papers case), 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per
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quent to publication.'
Language extolling the media's constitutionally created
status can be found in most if not all decisions interpreting the
free press clause.' However, the general trend in first amend-
ment adjudication has been to view the free speech and free
press clauses as co-extensive. Decisions rendered under the free
speech clause, in fact, have tended to reach results analogous
to those obtained under the free press clause.' Journalists,
nonetheless, have adamantly contended that the free press
clause confers special constitutional protection to the media. 0
curiam). The government had sought to prevent publication of classified documents
dealing with the United States' activities in the Vietnam war prior to 1968, and it
claimed that such publication would provide the enemy with information and thereby
prolong the war. While a majority of the Justices believed that harm was a probable
result of the publication, they did not believe harm to be certain and therefore would
not allow the prior restraint. But see United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th
Cir. 1972) (although court order imposing prior restraint is unconstitutional, defiance
of court order can lead to contempt citation).
7. In addition to reviewing the constitutionality of defamation suits, which are
tantamount to other sanctions imposed subsequent to publication, the Supreme Court
has also reviewed the constitutionality of state regulations which prohibit the publica-
tion of truthful information. E.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469
(1975).
In Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978), a newspaper
publisher was convicted of divulging the name of a state judge under investigation by
the judiciary committee. The newspaper account, although accurate, violated a statute
designed to implement the state's constitutional mandate of confidentiality of discipli-
nary committee investigations. The Court reversed the conviction, holding that the
publication was protected by the first amendment. Although the Court refused to
decide the broad issue of whether truthful reporting about public officials qua public
officials would always be insulated from the imposition of sanctions, the unanimous
Court found that the public's interest in the operations of the judiciary and the conduct
of judges overrode the state's legitimate interest in confidentiality.
8. See cases cited at notes 3 & 4, supra.
9. Most cases have failed to distinguish between freedom of speech and freedom
of the press, invoking both as the applicable constitutional provision. See, e.g., South-
eastern Promotions, Ltd., v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975) (prior restraints); Organ-
ization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971) (prior restraints); St. Amant
v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) (defamation); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64
(1964) (defamation); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (obscenity). See
generally T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966); L.
LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 183-85 (1960); PRIVACY AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURES, supra
note 3, at 110; Nimmer, supra note 3, at 647-50; Wade, The Communicative Torts and
the First Amendment, 48 Miss. L.J. 671, 698-99 (1977).
10. See Gurfein, The Paradox of a Free Press, Newsday, June 4, 1978, reprinted
in COMMUNICATIONS LAW 161 (1978) ("While a free press approaches the absolute in
Claims of constitutionally mandated press privileges have
included the demand for constitutional protection of the news-
gathering process itself. In Branzburg v. Hayes" the Supreme
Court refused to recognize a first amendment privilege for a
reporter who would not reveal the name of his confidential
informant when ordered to do so by a grand jury. 2 The Court
acknowledged, however, that "without some protection for
seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscer-
ated.' 3 The Supreme Court was soon asked to define the scope
of this constitutional right to gather news in the companion
cases of Pell v. Procunier" and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co. '5
The plaintiffs in Pell were four prison inmates"6 and three
journalists. The journalists had unsuccessfully sought permis-
sion from the California Department of Corrections to inter-
protection, free speech has so many variations that it can hardly be absolute."); Stew-
art, supra note 4, at 633 ("If the free press guarantee meant no more than freedom of
expression, it would be a constitutional redundancy."). Contra, Burger, The Interde-
pendence of Judicial and Journalistic Independence, 63 GEo. L.J. 1195, 1196 (1975).
11. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
12. In Branzburg the reporter argued that unless he could promise confidential-
ity to his informants, those with vital information would be deterred from revealing
it, "all to the detriment of the free flow of information protected by the first amend-
ment." Id. at 680. The Supreme Court framed the issue in terms of a request for a
testimonial privilege for newsmen that other citizens could not invoke. In resolving the
issue, the Court balanced the state's interest in law enforcement and in insuring
effective grand jury proceedings against the "uncertain" burden on newsgathering.
"[W]e cannot seriously entertain the notion that the First Amendment protects a
newsman's agreement to conceal the criminal conduct of hie source, or evidence
thereof, on the theory that it is better to write about crime than to do something about
it." Id. at 692.
13. Id. at 681.
14. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
15. 417 U.S. 843 (1974). These two cases, Pell and Saxbe, came from different
courts which, in the face of identical factual circumstances, had reached contrary
results. In Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst, 494 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd
sub nom., Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., the circuit court had found a violation of
the media's constitutional rights under the first amendment. In Hillery v. Procunier,
364 F. Supp. 196 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd sub nom., Pell v. Procunier, the district court
found no constitutional violation. Because the Supreme Court utilized the same rea-
soning in both cases, they will be analyzed together, and subsequent references will
be to Pell.
16. The inmates involved in the Pell litigation argued that the prohibition of
face-to-face interviews abridged their own freedom of speech. The first amendment
claims of the inmates, which were rejected, involve issues beyond the subject matter
of this note and therefore will not be discussed.
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view specific inmates who had already consented to the inter-
views. Although the Department had previously permitted
face-to-face interviews with designated inmates, the practice
was abandoned following a violent episode 7 which the Depart-
ment attributed in part to its former permissive interview pol-
icy. Nonetheless, the Department did permit media represen-
tatives to tour and photograph the facilities. Additionally, jour-
nalists were allowed to engage in brief conversations with ran-
domly encountered inmates. 8
Relying upon the dicta in Branzburg, the journalists
argued that denial of access impinged upon their constitutional
right to gather the news. They contended that this arbitrary
policy was supported by no substantial governmental interest
and therefore impermissibly abridged freedom of the press. 9
17. Face-to-face interviews created "big wheels" who achieved notoriety and
influence. They often became instigators of disciplinary infractions, climaxing in an
escape attempt at San Quentin. 417 U.S. at 831-32.
Contra, id. at 866-67 & n.10 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also Burger, Our Options
are Limited, 18 ViLL. L. REv. 165, 167 (1972), in which Chief Justice Warren Burger
attributes increased public awareness of the conditions in prisons to the prison out-
breaks. It seems somewhat ironic that although the Court in Pell partially blamed the
press for instigating the prison outbreaks, Chief Justice Burger had already implicitly
acknowledged the pivotal role of the media in effecting reform, through its reporting
of those same outbreaks.
18. 417 U.S. at 830.
19. The test for determining the constitutionality of limitations upon the first
amendment rights of non-prisoners vis-A-vis prison regulations was enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), which dealt with the
constitutionality of prison regulations authorizing censorship of inmate correspon-
dence. The Court stated: "First, the regulation or practice . . . must further an im-
portant or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expres-
sion . . . . Second, the limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater
than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest
involved." Id. at 413.
The journalists in Pell contended that inasmuch as face-to-face interviews were a
demonstrably superior method of newagathering, their case could be distinguished
from Branzburg, where the result on newsgathering was "to a great extent specula-
tive." 408 U.S. at 694. See note 12, supra.
In addition, the government in Branzburg had a compelling interest in the effec-
tive administration of criminal justice. While the plaintiffs in Pell did not refute the
argument that face-to-face interviews created "big wheels," (see note 17, supra) they
contended that there was no substantial interest in a blanket restraint of all interviews.
417 U.S. at 833. See Washington Post, Co. v. Kleindienst, 494 F.2d at 1005-06, rev'd
sub nom., Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974). See also Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. at 870 (Powell, J., dissenting).
In rejecting the journalists' claims, the Supreme Court
noted that the prison's existing policy already granted the press
substantial access to the facility, including privileges not ex-
tended to the general public.20 The Court held that the Consti-
tution could not be invoked to compel greater media access, for
"newsmen have no constitutional right of access to prisons or
their inmates beyond that afforded to the general public."'"
Inasmuch as the public was prohibited from conducting face-
An additional factor stressed by the Court was the absence of any attempt by the
state to either conceal prison conditions or to otherwise interfere with investigative
reporting. 417 U.S. at 830. This factor tended to further deflate the argument that the
policy in question violated the first amendment. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at
682, where it was stated: "It is clear that the First Amendment does not invalidate
every incidental burdening of the press that may result from the enforcement of civil
or criminal statutes of general applicability." Under this interpretation, a more severe
restriction could abridge the first amendment. The dissent argued that the limitation
in question violated the first amendment because it was "categorical in nature."
Accord, Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 15.
20. Mr. Justice Stewart, who wrote the majority opinion, characterized the inter-
view ban as "[tlhe sole limitation on newsgathering in California prisons." 417 U.S.
at 831. For this reason, the Court found it "unnecessary to engage in any delicate
balancing of such penal considerations against the legitimate demands of the First
Amendment." Id. at 849. Because he stressed that a plethora of effective newsgather-
ing techniques were already available, Mr. Justice Stewart's rationale appears to be
that this prison policy of banning face-to-face interviews was but a de minimis intru-
sion of the press's newsgathering ability-not significant enough to call into play the
protections afforded by the first amendment.
21. Id. at 834. This statement, when lifted out of its context and read in vacuo,
appears to announce a categorical rule of law. However, see the additional factors
which prompted the statement, discussed in note 20, supra.
This rule, in fact, was first announced by the Court in Branzburg:
It has generally been held that the First Amendment does not guarantee
the press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to
the public generally.
Despite the fact that news gathering may be hampered, the press is regu-
larly excluded from grand jury proceedings, our own conferences, the meetings
of other official bodies gathered in executive session, and the meetings of private
organizations.
408 U.S. at 684-85. The examples given by the Court in Branzburg wherein the media
is denied access involve instances where the government has legitimate claims to
confidentiality.
. But see Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. at 841: "[Njeither
the Commonwealth's interest in protecting the reputation of its judges, nor . . . in
maintaining the institutional integrity of its courts is sufficient to justify the subse-
quent punishment of speech at issue here, even on the assumption that criminal
sanctions do in fact enhance the guarantee of confidentiality."
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to-face interviews, denial of this privilege to the press did not
impinge upon the first amendment.
Criticism of Pell primarily addressed the majority's insen-
sitivity to the special role of the press as "the predominant
gatherer and disseminator of information in modern society
... "22 The Court in Branzburg, however, had refused to ex-
tend special protection to the newsgathering process and had
analogized a reporter's duty to testify before the grand jury to
the duty incumbent upon all citizens. Pell, therefore, appears
consistent with the holding in Branzburg3 and comports with
22. Comment, Bans on Interviews of Prisoners: Prisoner and Press Rights after
Pell and Saxbe, 9 U.S.F.L. REv. 718, 731 (1975). The author argues that since there
are valid security reasons for denying the general public access to prisons, the press,
as the guardian of the public's right to know, needs special rights of access. For other
criticism, see Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 839-40 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. at 863 (Powell, J., dissenting); PRIVACY AND PuLC
DISCLOSURES, supra note 3, at 115.
Mr. Justice Stewart, who wrote the majority opinions in Pelt and Saxbe, had
dissented in Branzburg, accusing the majority of "a disturbing insensitivity to the
critical role of an independent press in our society." 408 U.S. at 725. In Branz burg Mr.
Justice Stewart had been willing to find a constitutional protection stemming from the
societal interest in a full and free flow of information to the public.
In Pell Mr. Justice Stewart reached an opposite result. Yet in PeU, as in
Branzburg, the reporter's news source was a voluntary informant. See Comment,
Prisons and the Right of the Press to Gather Information: A Review of Pell v. Procunier
and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 43 CiN. L. REv. 913, 920 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Prisons and the Right of the Press]; Comment, The Rights of the Public and the
Press to Gather Information, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1505, 1524 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
The Rights of the Public and the Press].
In both Pell and Branzburg, it was the governmental policy which was allegedly
impeding the flow of information. In neither case was the government itself the source
of the information. Yet, in a speech delivered shortly after Pell was decided, Mr.
Justice Stewart relied upon Pell as the rationale for the following statement:
There is no constitutional right to have access to particular government infor-
mation, or to require openness from the bureaucracy. The public's interest in
knowing about its government is protected by the guarantee of a Free Press, but
the protection is indirect. The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Infor-
mation Act nor an Official Secrets Act.
The Constitution, in other words, establishes the contest, not its resolution.
Stewart, supra note 4, at 636 (footnote omitted).
23. The primary difference between the two is the Court's method of disposing
of the first amendment claims. In Branzburg the Court relied on balancing the govern-
ment's interest in criminal justice against the uncertain effect upon newsgathering. See
note 12, supra. In Pell the Court accepted the government's assertion that face-to-face
interviews caused "big wheels," thereby creating a governmental interest in preventing
the interviews. See note 17, supra. Regarding the journalists' interests, the district
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the Supreme Court's tendency to equate the free speech and
free press clauses.
Pell, in equating the access rights of the press and the
public, purports to enunciate an easy formula for disposing of
the issue of press access to prisons and presumably other areas
of governmental activity.2' But, since the constitutional right
of public access has never been delineated, the Court appears
to be defining one unknown in terms of another.25 The unan-
swered question of Pell, as recognized by the dissent, is the
extent to which the public can claim a constitutional right of
access. At some point, the dissent predicted, restriction of ac-
cess might undermine the function of the first amendment."6
court held an evidentiary hearing to determine the extent to which effective newsgath-
ering depends upon the opportunity for face-to-face interviews. The factual determina-
tion was that such interviews are crucial to effective reporting. Washington Post Co.
v. Kleindienst, 357 F. Supp. 779 (1972). Unlike the uncertain effect of denying a
reporter's privilege, the result of denying the interviews was empirically proven. Yet
the majority in Pell refused to balance the two interests. See note 20, supra. See also
Prisons and the Right of the Press, supra note 22, at 917-18; The Rights of the Public
and the Press, supra note 22, at 1507.
24. In Garrett v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 914
(1978), such an "easy formula" was invoked to deny a reporter the right to film an
execution. The state had allowed reporters to witness the execution, Texas's first in
several years, but would not allow photographic equipment. Relying on the "no greater
access" statement in Pell, the court reasoned that since the public was not allowed to
film the execution, the media could not either.
Cases interpreting the press's right of access to the courtroom have tended to reach
analogous results, although these cases are supplemented by the language of the sixth
amendment insuring a "public trial." See, e.g., Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 47
U.S.L.W. 4902 (1979); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); United States v. Gurney,
558 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom., Miami Herald Pub. Co. v.
Krentzman, 435 U.S. 968 (1978).
25. Accord, KQED, Inc. v. Houchins 546 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1976) (Hufstedler,
J., concurring specially):
Two separate, but related questions are involved: (1) What kind of informa-
tion about prisons and prisoners does the public have a right to know? Or, to
put the question differently, from what kind of information about prisons and
prisoners should the public be excluded? (2) What kinds of limitations can be
imposed on the public and on the news media upon the means by which the
information to which the public is entitled can be gathered?
Id. at 295. See United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d at 1209 n.10, where it is stated: "It
appears that the logical extension of the media's right of access analysis [under Pell]
is to determine what right of access the public has. The public right of access, however,
has yet to be defined by the Supreme Court." See also PRIVACY AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURES,
supra note 3, at 106-07; The Rights of the Public and the Press, supra note 22, at 1507.
26. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. at 860 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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KQED provided the vehicle for the Supreme Court to
address this unresolved issue of Pell-whether the public
and the press have a constitutionally mandated-albeit co-
extensive-right of access at some level. Houchins, the sheriff
of Alameda County, California, had instituted a policy of to-
tally excluding both the press and the public from the Santa
Rita jail. KQED had reported the suicide of a prison inmate
in the Greystone portion of the jail. Informed by a prison psy-
chiatrist that the conditions at the Greystone facility were re-
sponsible for the prisoners' illnesses," KQED sought permis-
sion to inspect and photograph the facility.
After being denied any access at all, KQED, joined by the
Alameda Branch of the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People, filed for an injunction, alleging that
Houchins had violated its first and fourteenth amendment
rights. Specifically, the complaint alleged that "petitioner had
violated the First Amendment by refusing to permit media
access and failing to provide any effective means by which the
public could be informed of conditions prevailing in the Grey-
stone facility or learn of the prisoners' grievances." 8
The petition claimed that both the press and the public
had been aggrieved by Houchins' unconstitutional denial of
access. The relief requested, however, was access by the media,
for television coverage was alleged to be the most effective
means of informing the public of prison conditions. 29
27. In Brennemen v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 132-33 (N.D. Cal. 1972), the
district court found that the "shocking and debasing conditions which prevailed [at
Santa Rita jail] constituted cruel and unusual punishment for man or beast as a
matter of law."
28. As quoted in 438 U.S. at 4.
29. There are two aspects of the complaint which were never acknowledged or
considered by either the Supreme Court or the ninth circuit. Since KQED was joined
by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), it is
clear that the plaintiffs were not complaining of a denial of special access as was
claimed by the plaintiffs in Pell. The NAACP did not even request special relief, 438
U.S. at 20 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting), because the plaintiffs in KQED contended that
by allowing the media access, the NAACP would derive sufficient relief from the
abridgment of their own constitutional right to know the conditions at the prison. See
notes 3 & 4, supra, and accompanying text. See text at note 21, supra. The complaint
specified that the public was aggrieved by Houchins' actions, thereby asserting an
impingement on the public's rights under the first amendment. It is arguable that the
1014 [Vol. 39
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After institution of the suit, Houchins relaxed his no access
policy by conducting limited monthly tours of twenty-five per-
sons; these tours allowed access to selected areas of the prison,
excluding the Greystone area. Cameras were not permitted on
the tours, however, and prisoners were generally kept out of
sight. The district court, despite Houchins' inauguration of
tours, granted the injunction. 0
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously, though
in three separate opinions, upheld the injunction. The court
held that even though the press and the public have co-
extensive constitutional rights of access, Pell does not require
identical implementation of these rights because the access
needs of the press differ from those of the general public.3 ' A
concurring judge conceded that the injunction granted the
media greater access than that afforded to the public, but he
contended that regulations for the media must differ from regu-
lations for the general public.2 The third judge, concurring
specially, believed that the holding of Pell was not at issue:
"The [Pell] Court did not purport to address the question
complaint tests the unanswered question of Pel-the extent to which the public can
claim a right to compel the government to give access. See note 25, supra.
The second aspect of the complaint ignored by Chief Justice Burger involves a
problem analogous to mootness. At the time that the complaint was filed, Houchins
enforced a policy of total exclusion of both the public and the press. In the wake of
litigation, he began allowing limited access. See text at note 30, infra. The ninth circuit
clearly judged the constitutionality of Houchins' actions in light of the access provided
by the tours. Presumably, Chief Justice Burger did the same, yet his opinion lacks any
language indicating the time frame used.
Chief Justice Burger ultimately concluded that no constitutional rights were in-
volved. It appears that the same result would have been obtained had the Court
evaluated Houchins' total exclusionary policy which existed prior to institution of the
suit, yet that issue was not even considered by the Court. But see 438 U.S. at 27
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (urging that even if the limited tours survived constitutional
attack, it would be proper to evaluate the constitutionality of the no access policy
existing prior to commencement of litigation).
30. The preliminary injunction restrained Houchins from preventing access by
the news media to the Greystone area and other portions of the jail "at reasonable
times and hours" and ordered Houchins to allow the media to utilize photographic and
sound equipment to conduct inmate interviews.
31. 546 F.2d at 285-86.
32. Id. at 294 (Duniway, J., concurring) ("I happen to believe that ...the
media have a protected preferred right to access to information about the public's
business." Id.).
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whether news media could be confined constitutionally to regu-
lations controlling access to prisons or to prisoners that govern
group tours by the general public."3
Although the judges could not agree over the precise mean-
ing of the Pelt "no greater access" theory, 4 all three concluded
that inherent in the first amendment is a constitutional right
of access for both the public and the press. At the Supreme
Court, however, Chief Justice Burger framed the dispositive
issue so as to coincide with the precise issue in Pell-whether
the media has a constitutional right of access superior to the
rights of the general public. 5 This position was never asserted
by KQED. Mr. Justice Rehnquist, who stayed the injunction
pending the grant of certiorari, framed the issue as whether
Pelt is "impliedly limited to the situation where there already
existed substantial press and public access to the prison
"36
Pelt, in fact, was decided against a background of substan-
tial access already afforded to the press and public, coupled
with a lack of intent to conceal prison conditions. 7 The restric-
tion imposed upon the plaintiffs in Pell was an isolated limita-
tion upon the rights of the press. KQED, by contrast, involved
total exclusion,8 with no workable means for either the press
or public to inform themselves of prison conditions. Chief Jus-
tice Burger, however, viewed the cases as indistinguishable.
Mr. Justice Stevens, dissenting in KQED, observed that
Houchins' "no-access policy, modified only in the wake of re-
spondents' resortA to the courts, could survive constitutional
scrutiny only if the Constitution affords no protection to the
public's right to be informed about conditions within those
public institutions where some of its members are confined
... "3 The ninth circuit had assumed that such constitu-
tional protection exists. 0 The Chief Justice rejected the asser-
33. Id. at 295 (Hufstedler, J., concurring specially).
34. Id. at 286, 294 & 295.
35. 438 U.S. at 3.
36. 429 U.S. 1341, 1344 (Rehnquist, J., Circuit Justice, 1977).
37. See note 20, supra.
38. See text at note 27, supra.
39. 438 U.S. at 30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. 546 F.2d at 286 ("Implicit in the trial court's memorandum granting the
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tion, saying that there is "no discernable basis for a constitu-
tional duty to disclose, or for standards governing disclosure of
or access to information.""
Although Chief Justice Burger emphatically denied that
the right of access has any constitutional basis, the opinion is
equivocal as to whether the holding addresses merely the
media's right of special access or whether the holding encom-
passes the more important issue of the existence of a constitu-
tional right of access for the general public." Arguably, Chief
Justice Burger had at the outset already narrowed the purview
of the opinion by framing the issue as a claim of special access
by the media. The language of the opinion, however, seems to
address the general issue of access and to view it as a question
of policy which must be answered by the legislature.'3 Presum-
ably, under this theory, if the legislature chooses to provide
access, it is free to do so, but neither the press nor the public
can compel access as a constitutional right." Denial of access
by the legislature would impinge upon no constitutional rights,
so the courts would be powerless to intervene, for the issue
would be non-justiciable." If, however, the opinion was meant
to address merely the claims of special access by the media,
then the existence of the public's underlying constitutional
right of access remains undetermined, and the Court might,
under different facts, recognize that there exists, at some
threshold level, a constitutional right of access by the general
public.
The Chief Justice's language appears intentionally vague.
This would permit the Court, at a later date, to either distin-
guish KQED or to clarify the ambiguities." It is submitted,
preliminary injunction is' the finding that the First Amendment rights of both the
public and the news media were infringed by appellant's restrictive policy.").
41. 438 U.S. at 14.
42. See text at note 35, supra. If the only issue properly before the Court was the
claim of the media to special access, then the Chief Justice's statements regarding
the rights of the public are merely dicta and will not be controlling in a later case.
43. 438 U.S. at 16.
44. Id. But see Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 834.
45. See 438 U.S. at 12 ("[KQED's argument] invites the Court to involve itself
in what is clearly a legislative task which the Constitution has left to the political
processes.").
46. The possibility that the Court could later distinguish KQED is enhanced by
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however, that the facts of this case were conducive to the recog-
nition of a constitutional right of access. At the time of the
institution of the suit, the means available for informing the
public about the conditions at Santa Rita jail were nonexis-
tent, 7 and public awareness of conditions prevailing in prisons
is a necessary antecedent to prison reform. 8 Furthermore, no
compelling reason for secrecy was advanced by Houchins to
justify the no access policy. In Pell the "big wheel" phenome-
non was invoked as a governmental interest precluding face-to-
face interviews." In KQED no legitimate governmental interest
in totally excluding access was discussed, even though the dis-
trict court, after an evidentiary hearing, had concluded that
Houchins' exclusionary policy was not required by legitimate
penological interests.50 The Court could have recognized a con-
stitutional right of access under these narrowly circumscribed
facts, without the necessity of recognizing an unqualified right
of access to all information within the government's control.
Yet the result reached by Chief Justice Burger was proba-
bly the most practicable one achievable. Recognition of a con-
stitutional right of access, even under the compelling facts of
this case, would invite the judiciary to attempt to delimit and
define the requisite circumstances under which that right
would exist. The courts would be encouraged to adjudicate, as
a matter of constitutional law, the situations in which govern-
ment could be compelled to shed its veil of secrecy and open
the fact that this decision was a plurality opinion. Three justices adhered to the Court's
opinion, while three justices adhered to the dissent. Two justices did not participate.
The swing vote was cast by Mr. Justice Stewart. While Mr. Justice Stewart agreed
with the majority that "[tihe First and Fourteenth Amendments do not guarantee
the public a right of access to information generated or controlled by government, ...
the concept of equal access must be accorded more flexibility in order to accommodate
the practical distinctions between the press and the general public." Id. at 16 (Stewart,
J., concurring). This was the underlying rationale of the ninth circuit's opinion. See
text at note 31, supra. Mr. Justice Stewart agreed with respondent's assertion that
KQED required access on a more flexible basis, but he found two portions of the
injunction to be overbroad. See also Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435
U.S. at 849 (Stewart, J., concurring); Stewart, supra note 4.
47. 438 U.S. at 26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 830 n.7.
49. See note 17, supra.
50. 438 U.S. at 38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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its locked doors. Chief Justice Burger's conclusion that this
task is a function of the legislative branch is a sound one.5
Recognition of a constitutional right of access would pro-
vide protection to the information gathering process, a process
ignored by current first amendment doctrines which focus on
the dissemination of information. Once information is ac-
quired, even if in an unorthodox manner, the first amendment
has been construed to provide broad protection to the dissemi-
nation process, primarily through the doctrines developed in
the areas of defamation, prior restraints, and sanctions im-
posed subsequent to publication." Recognition of a constitu-
tionally mandated right of access might endanger the contin-
ued viability of these doctrines, by undermining the rationale
which prompted their development.
Suppose, hypothetically, that the right of access is given
constitutional protection. Government, believing itself consti-
tutionally required to provide access, divulges certain informa-
tion to the media. Government then has doubts whether the
particular information in question falls within the penumbra of
the constitutionally mandated right of access and files for a
temporary restraining order to halt publication pending judi-
cial determination of whether disclosure of this informatibn
51. Even with legislative guidelines, the resultant burden on the courts would
have been onerous had the Court recognized a constitutional right of access. An appro-
priate analogy can be drawn to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. §
552 (1966), as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974) and Pub. L. No.
94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976). Under FOIA, federal governmental agencies are required
to make available for public inspection all documents in the possession of that agency,
unless the information fits within one of nine specified exemptions. 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(1) to (b)(9) (1976). The Act provides for administrative and judicial review
when a request is denied pursuant to an exemption. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(6)(A)(ii) (1976).
Nonetheless, according to a statement issued by Attorney General Griffin Bell, in mid-
1977 there were "over 600 cases . . . pending in federal courts." Letter to Heads of All
Federal Departments and Agencies, reprinted in 123 CONG. REC. S.7763 (daily ed. May
17, 1977).
Had the Supreme Court in KQED recognized a constitutional right of access, the
resultant litigation would have been more voluminous than that under FOIA, since the
Court would have had to judicially determine the extent of the right and the exemp-
tions thereto. In addition, this right of access would presumably be applicable to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, see note 2, supra,
thereby proliferating the possible number of lawsuits.
52. See notes 5, 6 & 7, supra.
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was constitutionally mandated. The press invokes the doctrine
proscribing prior restraints. This doctrine is designed to protect
both the right of the disseminator to promulgate the informa-
tion and the correlative right of the recipient to know and re-
ceive that information.53 If there is a judicial determination
that the disputed information does not fall within the ambit of
the right to know, then the underlying rationale for the doc-
trine's application has been partially eviscerated. It is doubtful
that the doctrine invalidating prior restraints would be unaf-
fected by recognition of a constitutional right of access.
If, in the hypothetical framed above, the information is
published despite the judicial determination that there is no
constitutional right of access to this information, then govern-
ment might seek to impose criminal sanctions. The press would
then invoke the doctrine proscribing the imposition of sanc-
tions subsequent to publication. This doctrine, however, is
analogous to the doctrine against prior restraints in that it is
designed to protect both the right of the speaker to divulge
information in his possession and the corollary right of the
listener to hear the information." If the right of the listener to
know the information has been negated, then there would be
few barriers to prevent the imposition of criminal sanctions.
An impact can be predicted even in the area of defama-
tion, for if the publisher might have constitutionally compelled
the truth, there would be little basis for protection when false-
hoods are published. Thus, recognition of a constitutional right
of access could lead to erosion of the broad protection currently
afforded to the dissemination of information, thereby leading
to an eventual narrowing of first amendment protection.
Perhaps the most immediate reason why the Chief Jus-
tice's conclusion is sound is because a constitutionally pro-
tected right of access is not necessary to effect the acquisition
of information. The Freedom of Information Act" and Govern-
53. See Goodale, Legal Pitfalls in the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 29, 34.
But see Note, The Constitutional Guarantee of Freedom of the Press-Does It Cover
the Right To Gather News?, 8 J. PuB. L. 596, 598 (1959), where it is stated that "a
refusal to recognize the right to gather news is a previous restraint on the right to
publish."
54. See notes 3, 4 & 7, supra, and accompanying text.
55. See note 51, supra. Although the nine exemptions may operate to curtail the
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ment in the Sunshine Act"6 provide broad access to substantial
governmental information. Additionally, all states have en-
acted laws which in varying degrees minimize governmental
secrecy.57 And the saga of Watergate has reminded the Ameri-
can public that even without a constitutionally mandated right
of access, the press can and will continue to perform its vital
function as the watchdog of democracy.58
Dian Marie Tooley
TEN YEAR AcQuIsrrIvE PRESCRIPTION: GOOD FAITH AND
INTERRUPTION
Defendant in a petitory action asserted ownership to cer-
tain lands under claims of ten' and thirty' year acquisitive
prescription.' The Supreme Court of Louisiana recognized
accessibility of much governmental information, Congressional intent in amending the
Act was to narrow the exemptions. See, Sen. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1200, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 12 (1974).
See generally R. GORDON, THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND THE PRIVACY ACT
(1977); GOVERNMENT INFORMATION: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, SUNSHINE ACr, Pi-
VACY ACT 77 (1978); LITIGATION UNDER THE AMENDED FEDERAL FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT 3 (3d ed. 1977); S. THURMAN, THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION FROM THE
GOVERNMENT (Legal almanac series, no. 71. 1973).
In addition to legislative intent that the exemptions be narrowly construed, Attor-
ney General Griffin Bell has advised federal agencies to comply with requests for
information, adding the caveat that "the Justice Department will defend Freedom of
Information Act suits only when disclosure is demonstrably harmful, even if the docu-
ments technically fall within the exemptions in the Act." Bell, supra note 51.
But see PRIVACY AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURES, supra note 3, at 107, where it is argued
that the press often does not benefit from FOIA inasmuch as government has ten days
to comply with requests. Thus the press may not receive the information in time to
publish it. See also Nader, Freedom From Information, 5 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1,
2 (1970), where it is charged that the FOIA has been "forged into a shield against
citizen access."
56. Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976).
57. Statutory references are compiled in S.THURMAN, supra note 55, at 67-84.
58. In lieu of the present free press clause in the first amendment, James Madi-
son's proposed amendment would have read: "[T]he freedom of the press, as one of
the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable." I ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (Gales &
Seaton eds. 1789).
1. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3478-98.
2. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3499-3505.
3. The plaintiff had already lost a possessory action brought by the defendant
